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In Honor of Matthew Rabin: Winner of
the John Bates Clark Medal
Colin Camerer and Richard H. Thaler
A lthough there is some evidence that Matthew Rabin existed before 1990,we had the pleasure of discovering him for ourselves when, in the early1990s, he sent each of us a copy of his manuscript “Incorporating Fairness
into Game Theory and Economics” [2]. Matthew was, at this time, an assistant
professor in Berkeley’s economics department, having recently finished his grad-
uate training at MIT. The paper was remarkable in many ways, and it induced us
both to call around and ask: “Who is this guy Rabin?” Now, just a decade later, we
find ourselves writing an article in honor of his winning the John Bates Clark award.
So, who is this guy?
Fairness
In explaining who Matthew Rabin is, and why he deserved the Clark award, we
will start with that remarkable fairness paper. Economists and game theorists have
long used two standard assumptions in modeling behavior: rationality and self-
interest. These working assumptions persisted in spite of growing experimental
evidence that both rationality and self-interest are “bounded.” In game theoretic
contexts, evidence that people care how much others get was abundant: In a
standard one-trial prisoner’s dilemma game, where the rational selfish choice is to
defect, roughly half the players cooperate. Or consider the ultimatum game, in
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which one player (the proposer) makes an offer to divide some pie between herself
and a responder, and the other player, the responder, can either accept, in which
case the division is made as proposed by the proposer, or reject, in which case both
players get nothing. Selfish rational responders will accept any positive offer, but
offers of less than 20 percent of the pie are typically rejected, even when the pie is
substantial—say, a “pie” of $400 for Americans or several days’ wages in less-
developed countries (Camerer, 2003, chapter 2). Many economists had reacted to
this anomalous evidence by either trying to make it go away (say, by giving
experimental subjects more opportunities to learn or by raising the stakes) or by
trying to rationalize it (typically, by arguing that subjects are mistakenly applying a
rational repeated game strategy in a one-shot game). Neither of these reactions
generated much new insight.
Matthew took a different tack that was unusual at the time, taking the exper-
imental evidence at face value and using it to infer a utility function incorporating
fairness. Suppose that responders in the ultimatum game reject offers of 5 percent
of the pie because they think that a 95–5 division is “unfair,” and they are willing to
forego 5 percent in order to punish the offending proposer. Suppose that subjects
in the prisoner’s dilemma game cooperate because they realize that if everyone
cooperates, they all are all better off. Rabin set out to incorporate such common-
sense notions into a standard game-theoretic model.
Rabin went about this task with what has now become his standard modus
operandi. He began by critically reading everything relevant, which in this case
means dozens of experimental papers by psychologists and economists. (He soon
had compiled a massive bibliography of papers on psychology and economics and
induced our friend George Loewenstein to describe him as a human “Pac-Man,”
Matthew Rabin
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who gobbles up psychology.) A key insight from his readings was that people are
neither selfish nor altruistic all the time. Rather, people engage in a type of reciprocal
fairness: they are nice to people who are nice to them, but mean to people who harm
them. The next question was how to capture this property in an economic model.
Matthew’s trick is a “kindness” function, which measures whether one player is
being nice or mean to another player. Niceness is a positive number and meanness is
negative. Players get utility from material payoffs and from the product of how nice they
are and how nice the other player is. This specification makes players want to behave
nicely toward nice guys and also behave meanly toward jerks (since the product of two
negative kindnesses is positive—revenge against an enemy increases utility).1 Given
1 Technically, kindness is defined by assuming that a player A’s move, given A’s belief about what B will
do, effectively awards the other player B a payoff. Define a “fair” or kindness-neutral payoff as, say, some
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these fairness-adjusted payoffs, Rabin then applies standard equilibrium concepts.2
Some empirical bite comes from the assumption that the fairness terms are indepen-
dent of the scale of payoffs, so that fairness becomes less important as monetary payoffs
get larger.
A familiar example is the prisoner’s dilemma. Table 1 shows equilibrium
payoffs adjusted for fairness.3 The Cooperate-Cooperate (C,C) money payoffs are
(4,4), the Defect-Defect (D,D) payoffs are (0,0), and the Cooperate-Defect payoffs
are (0,6). The term  is the relative weight on fairness compared to money.
Consider the Row player’s payoffs. If she chooses C when the Column player
chooses D, she suffers a fairness penalty of .5 because Column played meanly.
Conversely, if she expects the Column player to choose C, then reciprocating
cooperation by also choosing C is nice (because it gives Column a better payoff
than if Row defected). Column is also being nice by not taking advantage and
defecting; the product of the mutual niceness adds a fairness bonus of .75 to the
material payoff of 4, yielding a total payoff for Row in the (C,C) cell of 4.75.
Thus, mutual cooperation is a fairness equilibrium when  is large enough (spe-
cifically, where 4  .75 or   3.33). In this view, the prisoner’s dilemma is a
coordination game in which players try to coordinate their emotions or levels of
niceness. This interpretation jibes nicely with the experimental observation that
players are often “conditionally cooperative”—those who cooperate tend to expect
others to cooperate too.
By transforming the prisoner’s dilemma into an emotional coordination game
with multiple equilibria, Rabin’s approach can explain why there is a deep inde-
terminacy in what will happen. The same group of people might play cooperatively
if they expect niceness, but might defect if they expect defection. This property of
average of the most and the least that A can “give” B through her own move. Then kindness is just the
difference between the payoff that A’s move gives to B and the fair payoff, suitably normalized so that
kindness is between 1 and 1
2
. (Kindness does not lie between 1 and 1 for technical reasons.)
2 Rabin used the “psychological games” approach for which Geanakoplos, Pearce and Staccheti (1989)
deserve credit.
3 The table is an abuse of notation because fairness-adjusted utilities depend on one’s strategy, beliefs
about others’ strategies and beliefs about beliefs. Think of the adjusted payoff in each cell as the
equilibrium payoff if choices, beliefs and iterated beliefs match. The upper right row payoff 0  .5 for
example, is Row’s fairness-adjusted payoff if she plays C, believes Column will play D and believes
Column believes she will play D.
Table 1
Prisoner’s Dilemma with Fairness-Adjusted
Payoffs
Column
C D
Row C 4  .75, 4  .75 0  .5, 6
D 6, 0  .5 0, 0
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the model gracefully accommodates the empirical effects on cooperation rates of
many variables that do not directly affect payoffs and that have long puzzled
economists. For example, the variable that most changes in cooperation rates in a
one-shot prisoner’s dilemma game is not game-theoretic training, culture or pay-
offs—it is the ability of players to exchange costly, nonbinding communication that
theorists call “cheap talk” before playing (Sally, 1995; Ledyard, 1995). Cheap talk
can have an effect, in Rabin’s model, because it addresses the players’ central coordi-
nation problem—are we going to be nice to each other or not? Saying you will
cooperate can shift another player’s beliefs, which can lead her to cooperate and then
make you want to cooperate as you promised to. (In game-theoretic jargon, promising
to cooperate is a correlating device.) Similarly, cheap talk tends to shift behavior toward
efficient outcomes in other coordination games (Camerer, 2003, chapter 7).
Another variable that is irrelevant in standard game theory is how the prison-
er’s dilemma game is described to players. In experimental studies, if the prisoner’s
dilemma is described as a “community game,” players cooperate more than if it is
described as a “Wall Street game” (Ross and Ward, 1996). In Rabin’s approach,
labels can matter just as they do in Schelling’s (1960) famous “focal point” exam-
ples—because labels can influence players’ expectations about whether others will
behave nicely or meanly. Indeed, in Rabin’s fairness-adjusted prisoner’s dilemma,
those expectations are self-fulfilling because players are trying to match their
niceness with others.
Another interesting example is “Chicken,”4 with fairness-adjusted payoffs
shown in Table 2. In this game, the two choices are to play “Chicken” or “Dare.”
The Nash equilibria are (C,D) and (D,C)—one player backs down and chooses
C(hicken) when the other is expected to choose D(are). However, when the
fairness factor  is large enough (above 4), a player who expects the other to pick
D would rather choose D, earning 2, than choose C and let the mean player take
advantage, suffering a loss of $.5 Similarly, when   4/3, then reciprocating the
choice of Chicken with Chicken pays, because it repays the other player’s kindness.
Thus, if fairness effects are large, then either (C,C) and (D,D) are fairness equi-
libria.
4 Many of the small gems to be found in reading Matthew’s papers are in the footnotes. For example,
in this paper, when he introduces the game “Chicken,” he offers the following footnote: “While I will
stick to the conventional name for this game, I note that it is extremely speciest—there is little evidence
that chickens are less brave than humans and other animals.”
Table 2
Chicken with Fairness-Adjusted Payoffs
Column
Dare (D) Chicken (C)
Row Dare 2, 2 2, 0  .5
Chicken 0  .5, 2 1  .75, 1  .75
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This example is important because the set of outcomes allowed by fairness is
completely the opposite of the standard equilibrium outcomes. In this sense, Chicken
is the best game to use to contrast fairness and pure self-interest, a better game than
ultimatum bargaining, prisoner’s dilemmas and other games that have been much
more thoroughly studied. The game also captures both the mutually happy and
mutually angry aspects of social preference, like a couple who sacrifice to please
each other, only to end up in an ugly “War of the Roses” divorce in which their sole
goal is to harm the other person who harms them. The off-diagonal cells are the
thin line between love and hate. Moreover, experimental evidence shows that the
Chicken-Chicken and Dare-Dare outcomes are more likely than the Nash outcomes
(C,D) and (D,C) (Rutstrom, McDaniel and Williams, 1994).
An intuitive way to think about Matthew’s fairness model is that it combines
two forces: material payoffs and the concern for mutual fairness that leads (in
equilibrium) to mutual kindness or mutual unkindness. In the prisoner’s dilemma,
material concerns lead to mutual defection, while fairness leads to either both
parties cooperating or both parties defecting—but undermines the asymmetric
(Cooperate, Defect) outcomes. In Chicken, material concerns lead to the asym-
metric outcomes of (Dare, Chicken) or (Chicken, Dare), but fairness undermines
these outcomes and favors either (Dare, Dare) or (Chicken, Chicken).
Rabin proves several propositions about the existence and characterization of
fairness equilibrium. He also shows that firms cannot sustain monopoly prices
because fair-minded buyers will “reciprocate” what they perceive as unfair price-
gouging by withholding demand. (This result happens in experiments, too, as in
Ruffle, 2000.) An application to gift exchange in employment also shows how a
worker might reciprocate a high wage with high effort, even when workers are free
to shirk and there are no reputational advantages to working hard, as observed in
many experiments (for example, Fehr and Ga¨chter, 2000).
Matthew’s fairness paper also highlights another characteristic of most of his
work: He is fearless about proposing a model that is provocative and an important
start, but admittedly wrong in some dimensions. His paper includes a long discus-
sion of the model’s flaws, which is both humble and a wise strategy for fending off
criticism by preempting it.
The Pre-Behavioral Rabin
Before taking the plunge with his fairness paper, Matthew had been honing his
craft as a game theorist working on topics such as communication and signaling
that were, at that time, closer to the mainstream in game theory. These early papers
often show flashes of the same flair for invention that characterizes all of Matthew’s
work—his ability to invent useful new constructs.
For example, his paper on “Reneging and Renegotiation” [1] contributes to
the literature on renegotiation in the theory of repeated games and introduces
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formal concepts of temptation (the biggest short-term gain from cheating on the
implicit agreement) and credibility (if a player cheats once his credibility is shot).
Another early interest of Rabin’s is communication in games. Before the 1980s,
theorists suspected that either preplay communication didn’t matter at all (unless
promises are binding) or that communication could guarantee equilibrium and
efficiency. A flurry of research in the 1980s and 1990s suggested that the theoretical
value of communication lies in between those extremes. In a paper in this journal,
Farrell and Rabin [8] summarize what was learned. When players have a common
incentive to communicate private information, then they are likely to do so. But
when players’ incentives are not aligned, the effects of communication are severely
undermined. It is often impossible to rule out “babbling equilibria” in which
players expect their messages to be ignored, so they have no incentive to say
anything meaningful. To refine out these equilibria, either evidence, a theory of
meaning or some auxiliary assumptions are needed. For example, Rabin [3] tackles
this problem by considering the effects of communication about intentions. The
bad news from this literature is that a limited amount of communication may not
help the players. The good news is that communication eventually does help. As
Farrell and Rabin [8, p. 116] put it, “[T]he worst a player can do is to give up and
say to the other, ‘You choose,’ which at least assures enough communication can
always keep players from slipping into an outcome which is bad for both of them.”
Costa-Gomes (2002) showed how data from many experiments corroborate Rabin’s
prediction.
In another paper on communication much admired by formal theorists, Rabin
and Sobel [7] tackle a subtle problem in the logic of signaling games. Signaling
games often have implausible equilibria because they presume that if a sender does
something unexpected, then the receiver makes a strange guess about what “type”
of player the sender might be. For example, in simple models of education as a
signal of ability, there can be equilibria in which nobody gets educated because
people who get educated are thought by employers to be dumb rather than smart;
so it doesn’t pay for smart people to go to college. Rabin and Sobel present a theory
of play in which sender types are tempted to deviate from this equilibrium and show
which equilibria are viable after this theory of play. The results are surprising, deep
and required a lot of new mathematical machinery to prove.
The Psychological Rabin, Post-Fairness
After the publication of the fairness paper [2] in the American Economic Review,
Matthew turned his attention almost exclusively to psychology and economics, and
we devote the rest of this paper to that work.
Quasi-Bayesian Expectations
Bayesian updating is at the heart of most information economics and, more
generally, any model that incorporates rational expectations. A problem for
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economists has been that even if they were inclined to believe that agents do not
typically make Bayesian forecasts, there has not been an alternative model that is both
tractable and descriptive. Matthew’s contribution is a “quasi-Bayesian approach” in
which some cognitively plausible error or miscalculation is permitted, and then the
technical apparatus of Bayesian updating is applied to the miscalculated numbers.
His paper with Schrag on “confirmatory bias” [12] illustrates the quasi-
Bayesian approach. They first point out evidence suggesting that people are prone
to misread vague evidence as confirming, rather than disconfirming, what they
believe. To model this, they assume there are two hypotheses, A and B, and the
diagnosticity of signals is a parameter ; that is, conditional on A being true, a
supportive signal is generated with probability . Therefore,   0.5 means signals
don’t tell you anything. Rabin and Schrag start with the premise that if people think
hypothesis A is more likely than B, then evidence that is consistent with A is always
encoded correctly, but evidence that disconfirms A is mistakenly encoded as being
consistent with A q percent of the time (q  0 is just Bayes’ rule with no bias). This
kind of encoding bias is deeply rooted in perception and can be viewed as adaptive
behavior when faced with cognitive constraints. People literally do not process brief
images they do not expect; and conversely, after buying a new car, it is common to
notice more examples of the same car while driving around.
Some interesting results follow. For example, feedback and experience can
make people who started out believing in A overconfident about A. The most
striking result is that, if the signals are weak enough, then even a small degree of
confirmation bias keeps agents from ever figuring out the truth, even with infinitely
many signals. A fashionable theory in financial economics to explain the massive
volume of speculative trade is that agents have different “priors” (Harris and Raviv,
1993). But agents in financial markets who have been trading for years don’t hold
priors, per se—in Bayesian language, they are posterior beliefs, not priors. For
example, many money managers have been firm believers in “value” strategies for
over 20 years, while many others have believed in “growth” strategies for the same
length of time. As stocks go in and out of favor, the two groups trade with one
another. Rabin and Schrag’s theory puts a firm foundation beneath these
differences-of-opinion stories by explaining precisely how two people who begin
work on Wall Street with different ideas about how markets work can persistently
disagree throughout their entire careers. Confirmation bias can also explain how
an incorrect theory (pick your favorite example to insert here) can persist for
decades or even centuries in spite of massive contrary evidence.
Law of Small Numbers
Matthew also applies the quasi-Bayesian approach in his paper [17] on the “law
of small numbers.” This “law” is a term coined by Kahneman and Tversky, half-
facetiously, to describe the human tendency to jump too quickly to conclusions
from small samples. The law of small numbers is illustrated by the “gambler’s
fallacy”—the mistaken (and irresistible) belief that a roulette wheel that has come
up red several times in a row is “due” for a black outcome. This mistake is
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manifested in actual betting behavior. Consider New Jersey’s pick-three numbers
game, in which everyone who bet on the winning three-digit number shares the
pool (minus the state’s healthy cut of half). A couple of days after a particular
number wins, bets on that same number dip to about 60 percent of their typical
level, then slowly rebound after about eight weeks (Terrell, 1994). Racetrack
bettors also bet less on unlikely “longshots” in later races if a longshot won earlier
in the day (Metzger, 1985), as if “lightning doesn’t strike twice.”
Rabin models the law of small numbers by assuming that people mistakenly
conceive of independent Bernoulli trials as draws without replacement from an urn
with N balls. (The model generalizes Bayes’ rule because it reduces to Bayes when
N is infinite.) The model is custom-built to capture the gambler’s fallacy, because
sampling without replacement creates negative autocorrelation between draws. But
the model also predicts “over-inference bias.” For example, suppose biased inves-
tors are considering mutual funds. They will be surprised by a streak of successes
and will mistakenly conclude that a fund with a short winning streak must be good.
On the opposite end, they will write off a fund as a loser too quickly after a short
slump. This kind of “overinference” leads to “false variation bias,” or a belief that
the dispersion of true skill is greater than it really is. Rabin also shows that these
mistakes can lead people to switch funds too frequently. In addition, “overinferrers”
become pessimistic because their fund history tends to be dominated by losers that
were only held briefly, so they think most funds are no good.
We think this model is a big part of the explanation for why there are so many
mutual funds (more than the number of traded stocks) and why new ones are
created all the time. It could also be applied to domains like the market for
managers, sports coaches or even mates. Rabin also shows how the model can
explain the well-known fact that stock markets underreact in the short-term and
overreact in the long-term to public information such as earnings announcements.
In Rabin’s model, investors expect mean-reversion, so they aren’t impressed by a
short streak of good earnings (they underreact); but they also overinfer that a firm
must be terrific after a long streak of good earnings, and they overreact (Barberis,
Shleifer and Vishny, 1998).
Rabin’s law of small numbers paper illustrates an important feature of his
modeling: The models not only express a psychological regularity (the law of small
numbers), they actually do new psychology, by predicting a fresh bias (false varia-
tion). Psychologists had not predicted this bias, perhaps because the insight comes
from mathematics, which is not a standard engine of discovery in psychology. Rabin
also provides a unifying explanation of why there can be both a gambler’s fallacy in
betting on lottery numbers and a persistent belief in positive autocorrelation—a
mythical “hot hand” in sports performance (Gilovich, Vallone and Tversky, 1985).
(Contrary to popular belief, basketball players who hit a couple shots in a row are
not more likely to hit their next shot, even in free-throw shooting or experiments
where there is no defensive adjustment to cancel out performance momentum.)
Economists wonder why people don’t learn to correct their mistakes, and Rabin’s
models can explain why. Mistakenly expecting outcomes to even out, then observing
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that they do not, can lead to switching from one mistake to another and coming to
believe that the time series must have “momentum.” As Rabin explains, “Faced with
actual independence of signals, people develop a bogus belief in a form of positive
autocorrelation in signal generation that to them explains the missing negative
autocorrelation they expected due to gambler’s fallacy.”
Risk Aversion
Risk aversion is a cornerstone concept of economics. The traditional explana-
tion for risk aversion has been based on the diminishing marginal utility of wealth.
Since von Neumann and Morgenstern, the standard practice in economics has
been to assume agents maximize expected utility, and the traditional way of
implementing that assumption is to assume agents maximize the expected utility of
final wealth. What most economists have failed to realize is that this standard
approach is incompatible with much of the behavior it is used to model. This result
is demonstrated in Rabin’s short Econometrica paper [13].
Take the example of someone being offered a coin flip bet: heads, he wins
$105; tails, he loses $100. This bet has little appeal to most people; if you have any
doubt of this fact, ask the students in your class, or your spouse, hairdresser or
plumber. When confronted with such commonplace behavior, economists haul out
their standard explanation and say that this behavior is “risk aversion.” Most of us
have drawn the familiar concave utility of wealth curve, labeling W and drawing a
linear chord below it, to explain to our students why this framework is obviously the
explanation for such behavior.
Matthew made calculations about what such a choice would imply about that
utility of wealth function. His insight was that curves that are slightly concave locally
are extremely concave globally. How concave? What he shows is that if someone turns
this bet down at all wealth levels, then that person will also turn down an oppor-
tunity to flip a coin in which she risks losing $2,000, but stands to gain all of Bill
Gates’s fortune and then some (more precisely, an infinite amount). Of course, no
one with nontrivial wealth (or borrowing power) would turn the second bet down,
but most will turn the first bet down. There is no trick here, so as economists, we
have a problem. To a first approximation, agents who maximize their expected
utility of wealth must be virtually risk neutral for bets that are small relative to their
wealth. Therefore, when we see people declining attractive smallish bets, the
explanation must be something other than the one normally used.
Do people turn down bets of the $105/$100 variety? Yes, frequently. There is
voluminous experimental evidence of such behavior using both real and hypothet-
ical choices; for a recent illustration, see Holt and Laury (2002), who find that the
risk aversion displayed in answers to hypothetical questions becomes even more
pronounced for real stakes. Behavior outside the lab is also abundant. Consider the
behavior of buyers of automobile collision insurance. Based on data from 1994–
1996, more than half of the purchasers of collision insurance elected a deductible
of $250 or less. A typical consumer could save about $80 a year by increasing the
deductible from $250 to $500 (Grgeta and Thaler, 2003). Similarly, extended
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warranties for small-ticket items such as cell phones is a big-ticket business for major
electronics retailers. Unless we posit that retailers and insurance companies are
selling these policies at a loss, it is difficult to explain why risk-neutral consumers
would buy them.
Rabin’s conclusion is that economists need something other than expected
utility of wealth to explain what has been conventionally interpreted as risk aversion
for moderate stakes. He thinks (and we concur) that one ingredient that is
necessary to explain this behavior is what Matthew has called “piecemeal prefer-
ences.” The idea is that decisionmakers tend to view decisions one at a time, and
independent of the rest of their life, rather than incorporating the decision at hand
with the rest of life’s portfolio of risks. This behavior is also called myopic loss
aversion, narrow framing or bracketing, or decision isolation. Matthew joined Daniel
Read and George Loewenstein to write a comprehensive survey of this topic [10].
Procrastination and Self-Control: Doing it Now or Later
Matthew has written several papers on procrastination and self-control with
Ted O’Donoghue. In contrast to much of Matthew’s other behavioral theorizing,
Matthew and Ted were relative latecomers to this particular party. Early work by
Strotz (1956) and Pollak (1968) introduced the idea of time-inconsistent prefer-
ences, and David Laibson (1997) had recently rekindled interest in this topic with
an explicitly behavioral approach. So why did Matthew take up this topic? We
suspect that as a self-proclaimed avid procrastinator, he couldn’t resist the temp-
tation to dig into the problem (eventually).
The point of departure for this research is the observation that people exhibit
a specific type of time inconsistency that O’Donoghue and Rabin [11] have dubbed
present-biased preferences and what Laibson calls quasi-hyperbolic discounting.
(These two models have identical structures.) In choosing between a smaller
reward right now versus a bigger one tomorrow, many people opt for the small
immediate reward. However, if the choice is between a smaller reward in 30 days
and a larger reward in 31 days, the same people choose the larger award. This
behavior produces dynamic inconsistency, because one choice is preferred if it is off
in the future, but the other choice is preferred in the present. An agent who has
present-biased preferences predictably changes her mind over time. Agents who
discount the future using exponential discounting, as normally assumed in eco-
nomic theory, do not display this inconsistency. The now standard approach to
modeling such present-biased preferences is the so-called beta-delta model. In this
model, preferences can be represented by
For all t, U t ut,ut 1, . . . ,uT 	 
tut   
Tt1
T
TuT where 0 
 ,   1.
In this model,  represents long-run time consistent discounting, whereas  rep-
resents the bias for the present. If  
 1, then preferences are present biased.
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A question that has long puzzled theorists is whether agents are aware of this
predictable pattern in their own behavior. Most economists assume that people are
“sophisticated” about their time inconsistency and so will seek external self-control
to limit their own future behavior. O’Donoghue and Rabin were surprised that
economists had rarely explored the implications of the alternative assumption that
agents “naively” assume their current preferences over future options will remain
constant (for an exception, see Akerlof, 1991). So in their early papers,
O’Donoghue and Rabin spell out the implications of the assumptions of extreme
sophistication and naivete´. They find, surprisingly, that naive agents need not
behave in crazy ways, and they sometimes even take actions that seem more sensible
than those sophisticated agents take.
O’Donoghue and Rabin [11] consider three types of agents: those who are time
consistent, sophisticates, who realize their preference change over time, and naifs, who
think they are time consistent.5 They then consider a series of Rabinesque exam-
ples, beginning with this one: “Suppose you usually go to the movies on Saturdays,
and the schedule at the local cinema consists of a mediocre movie this week, a good
movie next week, a great movie in two weeks, and (best of all) a Johnny Depp6
movie in three weeks. Now suppose you must complete a report for work within
four weeks, and to do so you must skip the movie on one of the next four Saturdays.
When do you complete the report?” The example is made precise by assuming that
  1,   1/2 and the valuations of the mediocre, good, great and Depp movies
are 3, 5, 8 and 13.
The time consistent agents, who always do the rational thing, skip the movie in
the first week and do the report. The naifs procrastinate until the last Saturday.
Each week they (wrongly) think they will skip the movie the following week, so on
the last Saturday they have to finish the report and never get to see the best movie.
Counterintuitively, the sophisticates do the report in week two rather than in week
one like the time consistent agents. Here’s why: The period-1 sophisticate correctly
predicts that he would have self-control problems on the third Saturday and would
see the great movie, forcing him to do the report on the last Saturday at a high
opportunity cost (if he hadn’t done it earlier). However, the period-1 sophisticate
also correctly predicts that knowing about period-3 self-control problems will
induce him to do the report on the second Saturday. So the period-1 sophisticate
can safely procrastinate for one week.
If you think this result is odd, consider the next example. Now you have a
coupon to see exactly one of the movies in the next four weeks, and your allowance
does not permit you to pay for a movie. Which movie do you see? Predictably, the
time-consistent agents will wait and see the great Depp movie. Naifs see the merely
great (value 8) movie: On the first two Saturdays, they skip the mediocre and good
5 In the early draft of this paper, these types were labeled O’Donoghues, Laibsons and Rabins,
respectively. Without going into details here, let’s just say that the labels are apt.
6 For a picture of Johnny Depp, look at Rabin’s website and click on “picture of Matthew on a good hair
day.”
170 Journal of Economic Perspectives
movies incorrectly believing they will wait to see the Depp movie. However, on the
third Saturday they give in to temptation to go to the merely great movie. What
about the so-called sophisticates? Under the concrete values assumed in this
problem, they see the worst movie, in the first week! The period-2 sophisticate
realizes that his period-3 counterpart will give in to temptation and see the merely
great movie, so the period-2 self will choose to go to the good movie. But the
period-1 sophisticates anticipates this behavior by his period-2 self, and so he
decides to attend the mediocre movie. The ability to do backward induction,
combined with realism about future self-control problems, dooms the sophisticate
to see a worse movie than the naif does.7
It turns out that being sophisticated is not all it is cracked up to be. Sophisti-
cates sometimes complete an unpleasant task sooner than they would if they had no
self-control problem, but may end up consuming tempting goods later than they
would if they had no self-control problems. This leads O’Donoghue and Rabin to
investigate models somewhere between naive and sophisticated. A conception they
pursue in recent work has agents realize they have self-control problems, but are
too optimistic about their ability to resist temptation in future periods. (“I know I
have slipped up occasionally before, okay, more than occasionally, but next time
will be different.”) This approach is sensible to pursue and is consistent with some
empirical evidence about deadline setting and health club pricing (Ariely and
Wertenbroch, forthcoming; Della Vigna and Malmendier, 2002).
Projection Bias
Everyone has heard that if you go to the grocery store famished, you buy more
food. It turns out that this is not an old husband’s tale. One study finds that if
shoppers are given a muffin to eat before shopping, they buy fewer impulse items
(items not on their shopping list) than those who were not given a muffin (Gilbert,
Gill and Wilson, 2002). But how can this pattern persist if we all know about it? The
answer is that we must not be completely “sophisticated” about this phenomenon;
that is, even though we know we buy more when we are hungry, we underestimate
just how much more.
Loewenstein, O’Donoghue and Rabin [16] dub this phenomenon “projection
bias.” Projection bias means we think that our preferences in other states will be
closer to our current preferences than they actually will be. If we go into a
restaurant feeling like we haven’t eaten all day, we order a rich souffle´, underesti-
mating how stuffed we might feel when the souffle´ arrives. Their paper argues that
this bias about imagining how hungry or full we feel in the future extends to many
other domains.
The projection bias has much in common with the present-biased model of
7 The fact that foresight can undermine the sophisticates’ self-control is prominent in clinical studies of
addiction. Addicts often relapse because they reason that some day they will fall off the wagon, so they
might as well start right away. Combating this belief is why Alcoholics Anonymous encourages drinkers
to stay sober “one day at a time.”
In Honor of Matthew Rabin: Winner of the John Bates Clark Medal 171
intertemporal choice. In the present-biased model, people overweight the utility of
current consumption relative to future periods. With projection bias, people over-
weight the relevance of their current state (hungry, aroused, excited, depressed) in
their attempts to predict their preferences in future states. If we are depressed now,
we find it hard to imagine that we will ever be in the mood to go to a party. If we
are not aroused now, we find it hard to believe that we would fail to practice safe
sex when we are aroused. The model proposed by Loewenstein, O’Donoghue and
Rabin captures these intuitions and discusses examples that include overconsump-
tion early in the life cycle (underappreciating habit formation) and drug addition.
They then discuss welfare implications of the model. One clear policy implication
is support for “cooling off periods.” If people tend to buy a car or vacation time
share property in the heat of the moment, then regret it soon after when they have
calmed down, a three-day cooling off period offers them a chance to regain their
senses (and does little harm if they made a good choice they don’t want to reverse).
Morality
It is hard to spend much time in the “People’s Republic of Berkeley,” as
Matthew does happily, and not think at least a little about morality. Matthew has
two papers that do so.
One paper [4] is about cognitive dissonance and social change. Consider some
morally dubious activity such as littering, writing late referee reports or eating more
than your share of the jumbo shrimp at a cocktail party. Rabin assumes that people
select a level of this activity, say X, although they believe the morally legitimate level
is Y, which may be less than X. People get utility from activity level X, suffer painful
“cognitive dissonance” if X is greater than Y, and also incur a psychic cost (or
conformity penalty) if their moral belief Y is different from the average moral belief
in the community, Y. He shows, counterintuitively, that increasing the disutility
from dissonance can backfire and lead people to do more of the bad activity X. Why?
Raising the dissonance—by social shaming or public-service ad campaigns, for
example—does have direct effects of lowering the level of the activity X and the
morally legitimate norm for the activity Y. But it also has an indirect effect through
the psychic cost. Since it is painful to reconcile one’s belief with an accepted norm,
one solution to the suggestion that Y should be low is for everyone to give up and
backslide morally, choosing a higher value of Y, which then licenses people to
believe Y is acceptable and choose a higher level of X. Rabin shows that this
outcome can be an equilibrium. Take energy-hogging sports-utility vehicles as an
example. Moral preaching that sports utility vehicles are bad could result in an
equilibrium where people rebel, regard sports utility vehicles as less bad than
before (because the psychic cost of reconciling pro-SUV beliefs is too high for
everyone) and drive more sports utility vehicles. Another example is public looting.
Even if everyone thinks looting is wrong, how wrong it is—or more precisely, how
wrong it feels—depends on how many others are looting. One response to increased
moral scolding is for everyone to think others might loot more and, due to the
conformity effect, then everyone will loot more. While the model is stylized, it both
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follows Rabin’s colleague George Akerlof’s interest in drawing social phenomena
into economics and anticipates the recent interest among many other economists
in social norms and influence.
In the second paper on moral preferences [5], Rabin draws an interesting
distinction between agents who trade off raw preferences and moral concerns and
agents who make choices according to moral “rules.” Matthew first shows that
behaviors guided by distaste for acting immorally, or by rules, are observationally
equivalent. For example, working as a prostitute might result from simply hating
poverty more than sin, as a madam once famously remarked, or by having a moral
benchmark that permits prostitution. This observational equivalence has allowed
economists to remain comfortable modeling such choices as the result of smooth
tradeoffs (“there’s a price for everything”) rather than bound by moral constraint,
though the latter viewpoint is popular among sociologists and philosophers.
But Matthew shows that preference- and rule-based modeling approaches are
not exactly the same, in a subtle and surprising way. Suppose agents aren’t sure how
morally dubious an activity is, but can find out before they make a choice. (Think
of those earnest modern hippies who ask a restaurant waiter whether the ahi tuna
was line-caught rather than netted—since netting harms porpoises.) Preference-
guided people dislike feeling that they are doing harm, so they will be more willing
to find out the true harm they are causing and won’t do the activity if they find out
it is too harmful. Rule-bound people will, in contrast, either i) protect their ability
to do the behavior by not finding out, if they plan to do it or ii) will seek
information to permit themselves possibly to do it even if they think they probably
shouldn’t. (Perhaps they normally don’t eat ahi tuna, but the diner at the next table
seems to be enjoying hers quite a bit!) As a result, the rule-bound agents will cause
more social harm than preference-driven agents, because the rule-bound agents
sometimes avoid finding out how bad their behavior can be.8
This difference provides a rationale for social policy that forces people to find
out about the consequences of their actions, since rule-bound people will not seek
information, and their reluctance to find out is socially harmful. A dramatic
modern example is AIDS testing. People unknowingly infected with AIDS may put
others at risk by sharing needles or engaging in high-risk sex. Rabin’s model
explains why many of these people don’t want to be tested to see if they have the
disease: If they tested positive, they would have to stop doing something pleasurable
to themselves (and bad for others); but without testing, they can do so without
qualms (if they think they are low risk). Such questions are central to many
economic questions: half of sub-Saharan Africa is infected with HIV; the infection
rates are growing ferociously in Russia and other countries; and infection rates
remain high in many other countries or subpopulations, like certain American cities.
8 See Dana, Weber and Kuang (2003) for an interesting experiment that illustrates why search for
information distinguishes moral rules and preferences.
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The Character of Matthew
Matthew has been working on a book tentatively entitled Psychological Founda-
tions of Economic Theory. How he came to write that book sounds like an example
from one his papers. Once upon a time, he was asked to write an essay on Daniel
Kahneman and Amos Tversky [6]. Matthew began with characteristic seriousness
and produced a draft that came in at about 100 pages, roughly four times too long
for the book. During the writing of this draft, Matthew undoubtedly felt that he was
not working on this chapter, but rather was procrastinating about doing something
else, something more important, like getting tenure. (For years, he had a card-
board clock in his office that was labeled the “tenure clock.”) He later turned the
long version of the chapter into a 1998 survey for the Journal of Economic Literature
[9], but even that published survey was much trimmed down from its longer
version. The much-too-long version seemed like a good start on a book. When this
book is complete, we can say with confidence that it will be the place students begin
if they want to learn about psychology and economics. And if it takes Matthew a
long time to finish, he can say he was doing empirical work on procrastination the
whole time!
We have tried here to give readers a sense of what Matthew’s research has been
about, and we have dropped some hints about what a character he is. We would
need to be novelists to do full justice to the latter topic. Matthew is, well, compli-
cated. He loves bright colors. At workshops, he always has a collection of colored
pens and colorful toys to fiddle with. His hand-drawn overhead slides are crammed
with colors. (A good sign that the world is ending will be when Matthew adopts
PowerPoint.) He usually wears very loud tie-dye T-shirts purchased on Telegraph
Avenue in Berkeley. He may get some of the credit or blame for the fact that there
are still so many vendors in that locale.
Matthew is simultaneously very serious about his research, and very funny
about everything else. The working title of one of his early papers [3] (later
published in the Journal of Economic Theory) was “Preplay Communication: A
Lengthy-Paper Approach.” He jokes that he became a game theorist because his
father played “rock, paper, scissors” with real rocks, and he wanted to lose less
often. Although he is a fine speller, and a fanatic about the proper use of hyphens,
he never signs his name at the end of e-mails quite correctly (some recent examples
include: maththew, mathweh, mathtehw, mathhew). He is a big fan of Monty Python
and the Simpsons, and manages to work suitable references to them into his work.
Rabin and Thaler [14] made use of the famous Monty Python “dead parrot” sketch
in an “Anomalies” column in this journal based on Matthew’s risk aversion re-
search. In a recent law review paper [18] on paternalism, Matthew coined the term
“faith-based anti-paternalism” to refer to the view that paternalism is by definition
bad since people always choose what is in their best interest. He then managed to
insert as footnote 97 the following commentary on whether people who buy
extended warranties should be considered idiots: “In a classic Simpsons episode,
Homer was having a crayon hammered into his nose to lower his I.Q. (Don’t ask.)
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The writers indicated the lowering of his I.Q. by having Homer make ever stupider
statements. The surgeon knew the operation was complete when Homer finally
exclaimed: ‘Extended Warranty! How can I lose?’”
Matthew is also a very sweet and modest person. (Empirical proof is that he’ll
be embarrassed to read this article.) He is extremely generous with this time to both
students and colleagues (though he probably thinks of it just as more procrastination).
Matthew the person is important as an intellectual leader who showed how to
begin the long task of making economic models more realistic and better. Because
economists have been building models on the foundations of optimization and
equilibrium for a long time, no one will be able to come up with an alternative
approach that does as much with so little. The research agenda of adding psycho-
logical realism to economics is one of complicating the model to incorporate the
complex truths about people, much as other domains of economics have compli-
cated the models to incorporate complex truths about institutions. The idea that
firms maximize value is simple. Adding principal-agent problems and information
asymmetries adds realism at the cost of simplicity; but there is no doubt that adding
these complications has proved worthwhile. Similarly, incorporating bounded ra-
tionality, self-control problems and other-regarding behavior to simpler models of
human behavior will make models more complicated, but improve their predictive
power. (If not, don’t complicate the model!)
We hope young economists will follow Matthew’s lead. If they do, they will
make economics more true and more fun.
y Thanks to Bob Gibbons, George Loewenstein, Ted O’Donoghue and Joel Sobel for helpful
anecdotes and technical comments and to the JEP editors for doing their usual magic.
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